Introduction
In a number of lower income and transitional economies it is common for there to be significant delays at the border when achieving customs clearance. This can be due to complex customs formalities, which sometimes are continually changing, capacity constraints given limited facilities, and/or corruption at the border. In some African economies, there are reported delays of 3-6 months to achieve customs clearance 2 , although this is perhaps extreme.
Our paper begins with the observation that if such delays are significant and the length of the delay is endogenously determined, then trade liberalization through tariff reductions that increases the length of the queue can be welfare worsening. Tariff reductions, as have occurred in the CIS states, thus appear to be bad policy without first addressing customs clearance issues. We show this for small open economy cases in a simple general equilibrium model where there is a physical constraint on the volume of imports which can be admitted. We then analyse extensions where corruption occurs, and finally where some imports are perishable. We apply our analysis to data on Russian trade for the late 1990s, with the results emphasizing the themes that not only is it best to deal with border and administrative delays first before engaging in trade liberalization, but also the quantitative orders of magnitudes for the costs involved can be large.
A Model of Trade with Border Delays
The role and significance of border delays for trade liberalization in a number of economies around the world is reflected in anecdotal evidence on their importance in the trade of Russia and other former Soviet Union countries. Hare (2001) in a recent piece on trade policy in CIS transition economies says "It is often asserted that inadequate physical infrastructure -roads, railways, and the like -inhibits trade, though solid evidence for this is lacking. More often, the real barrier to trade is again institutional, taking the form of unreasonable customs delays at many borders in the transition economy region, accompanied by widespread demands for bribes to expedite the movement of goods."
The precise length of these delays and even/or how precisely they arise is unfortunately poorly documented in the literature but their impact on trade is unquestionable. There is some suggestion in the literature that continual changes in customs legislation and uncertainty as to how they are to be implemented is a key factor.
Equally, these delays are also thought to reflect the time taken for negotiations between officials and importers over valuation, which it is thought can fall dramatically through the use of negotiation intermediaries. Bribes seem to be involved in this process. These and other issues in the Russian case are discussed in Beilock (2002) , and Wolf and Gurgen (2000) . Delays in the range of weeks or months for clearance are often claimed in anecdotes, with six weeks being an approximate mean figure suggested to us for Russia in conversations although this varies substantially with the port of entry and transportation mode.
A Simple Model
The purpose of our paper is to focus on the interactions between border delays and trade liberalization in light of their seeming importance in these cases. We formalize these interactions in a model of a simple pure exchange economy which is small and a taker of prices on world markets and engaged in trade. For expositional simplicity of structure, we assume for now there is no production and all goods are traded (these features can be changed in numerical application). The world prices for the N goods we take as given by the w i π . Tariff rates t i apply to imports (t i = 0 for exports), and we assume the direction of trade is predetermined.
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In this economy, domestic prices depart from world prices on the import side both due to tariffs and queuing costs at the border T q (π). For simplicity, we assume these costs are the same for all goods, and that units for goods are denominated in comparable physical terms (e.g. tons). Thus, if M goods are imported and (N-M) exported, and the direction of trade is unchanged,
T q is assumed to be indexed and so is homogeneous of degree one in π and is endogenously determined.
The economy has market demand functions, ( ) 
Assuming there is a single representative consumer in this economy their budget constraint is given by
For simplicity, border delays are assumed to reflect a constraint on the volume of imports that can be processed over the period of time covered by the model (e.g. one year). Thus, for now, we consider this to be a physical constraint rather than one reflecting corruption or other considerations. If C represents the administratively determined capacity constraint on imports, then queuing costs. Since the latter use real resources, tariff reducing trade liberalization will typically be welfare worsening.
Model Extensions
This simple model can be extended in a number of ways which capture additional mechanisms through which border delays and trade liberalization can interact.
Corruption
One is the presence of corruption. This can be modelled simply in this framework as the ability of customs officials to extract a bribe for allowing passage of goods. We assume that there is a bound to the bribe, which for simplicity we take to be the ability of an official to send the importer to the back of the line in the event a bribe is not paid. If we assume that officials can only do this once, since otherwise they would reveal themselves as corrupt officials if they repeat the denial of clearance, this means that the bribe that can be extracted by the official is within epsilon of the queuing costs T q . For simplicity, we take the bribe paid to equal T q , which will now change relative to the no corruption case.
The discussion above suggests that the queuing costs in the formulation above are This also means that in equation (4) 
and
where λ is a constant, and so perish rates increase with queuing time.
With this formulation, differential impacts of queuing by commodity result and even uniform tariff liberalization now has differential impacts by good.
Other Extensions
Various other extensions to this basic model can also be made, which for space reasons we do not elaborate on in any detail. We can use a model with production rather than a simple pure exchange economy with endowments. We can also incorporate non traded as well as traded goods. Both of these are standard in numerical general equilibrium models of actual economies (see Shoven and Whalley (1992) ), although neither changes the basic analytical structure in which queuing costs are endogenously determined.
We can also modify the model set out above for cases in which different commodities incur different queuing costs per unit weight due to differing administrative procedures. This could arise with valuation procedures being more complex for, say, components for electronic products compared to basic commodities such as coal. This can be done by building in different factors of proportionality into the analysis for queuing costs for the various quantities imported. Again, the essential structure of the model remains unchanged.
Some Calculations Using Russian Data
Using this simple framework, we have made some calculations using Russian data to explore the possible quantitative orders of magnitude involved with analysis of trade liberalization that incorporate border delays. The delays reported in the Russian case appear to be lengthy and a major restraint on trade. These calculations thus serve to underline the point that if tariff reforms occur with no attention being paid first to administrative considerations and border delays, liberalization can be welfare worsening rather than welfare improving as is usually the case in conventional models rather than providing accurate point estimates of actual impacts. Importantly, they suggest that there are costs rather than benefits from trade liberalization in such cases and they can be substantial.
To apply the model set out above to the Russian case, we use CES demand functions and in addition specify the model so as to also include both a non-traded goods sector and two traded goods so that distortions between perishable and non perishable imports can be analysed. All model variants thus include four goods (an exportable, two importables, and a non traded good).
We use the standard applied general equilibrium modelling approach of calibration to a base case data set, followed by counter factual equilibrium analysis (see Shoven and Whalley (1992) ). To make our calculations of the impacts of trade liberalization incorporating border delays we have constructed a benchmark equilibrium data set for Russian trade, consumption, and endowments (taken to equal production) by averaging data for 1997, 1998, and 1999 4 . These are years during which there was substantial variation in Russian trade performance due to the 1998 financial crisis, and using averages in this way partially mitigates extremes in any one years data. We use tariff data from World Bank sources for 1999 5 , which suggests an approximate average tariff rate across all imports of 10%. We assume an average border delay of 3 weeks in customs clearance (6 weeks is the figure often claimed) . This is the basis for an approximate estimate that with non-delay shipping times from Western Europe of 3 days and formal transportation cost in the range of 5% (see Hummels (1999) for a recent discussion of the size of transportation costs in trade), delay costs could be in the range of 30% of the value of imports. We use this estimate as the base case value in our computations, making some modifications in the perishability case.
We use calibration methods and this data to determine both share and elasticity parameters in preferences. For the case of CES preferences, demands are given by 
In this case, the import demand elasticity,
4 Data on trade and consumption are taken from the 2001 World Development Indicators. Data on production by industry (which we use to represent endowments) originates from Goskomstat sources and we are thankful to Natalia Tourdyeva for providing it for us. Mirza (2002)). Not recognizing the significance of non traded goods can result in this problem since expenditure shares on traded goods are smaller in models with non traded goods than without them, and is one reason for including them in the model.
Using GAMS(1996) solution software, we calibrate both the basic model and associated variants to the averaged 1997-1999 benchmark data set. We then evaluate the effects of tariff reform for each model variant by computing counterfactual equilibria which we also compare to the base case. We also use a model variant where no border delays are present, which we term the conventional case. In this event, gains from tariff liberalization occur.
We classify the trade data into importables and exportables based on the sign of net trade flows by commodity. We use equation (5) to calibrate model share parameters from data on consumption and prices, choosing units for goods in the model such that world prices are one. Equation (5) is used jointly in calibration with equation (6) which determines σ given shares, once import price elasticity values are assumed.
6 Our calibrations yield share and elasticity parameter estimates for the basic model variants for assumed values of import price elasticities lying between -1 and -2 (one is the most frequently used in empirical trade models) as set out in Table 1 .
Using models parameterized in this way, we have generated two sets of results which allow us to analyse the interactions between trade liberalization and border delays.
In Table 2 , we show welfare and trade impacts of liberalization in the basic model with border delays and in two model extensions which incorporate corruption and perishability. These estimates are reported for the three values of assumed import price elasticities used in calibration in Table 1 . The second set of results in Table 3 compares those from the basic model with border delays to those from a more conventional model with no border delays. To make this comparison, we use a case for a conventional tariff model where there are no queuing costs in the base case, so that in this model relative price effects of tariff liberalization come into play as tariffs are eliminated and no queuing costs enter. In the comparable border delay model, the capacity constraint on imports remains. A tariff equal to the combined queuing plus tariff wedge in the base model is applied to the conventional model. We then consider a reduction in this tariff by 10 percentage points. In both of these cases, we use an import price elasticity of minus one in calibration. As Table 3 indicates, the signs of welfare effects are reversed between models, and the absolute values of effects are different. 
